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Abstract
The political impediments to reform and the forces allowing its
success are studied in a model where the tax base and statutory rate
are separate instruments of tax policy. The model predicts that big
bang reforms—large changes in the tax code–may be easier to enact
than marginal reforms. Preferences over the tax base face a tipping
point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support re-
form. At such a “reform moment”, tax reform is Pareto improving.
Politically feasible tax reform occurs when fiscal needs are large, but
may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal tax rates. There is
strategic complementary in lobbying for tax exemptions, resulting in
multiple equilibria. Evidence from tax-base changes in a panel of
OECD countries supports a number of the main predictions.
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1 Introduction
In an era of fiscal austerity, questions of tax reform have once again taken
center stage. In recent U.S. debates, both political parties expressed support
for reform.1 During the debt crisis in Southern Europe, calls to reform the
tax systems of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece could be heard. Tax re-
form has been one of the most contentious issues facing the current Indian
parliament. Why has the passage of reform been so difficult? Why do inef-
ficient tax systems persist? Are there economic or political conditions that
are particularly propitious for tax reform?
I propose a tractable model where a government meets its revenue needs
through a choice of not only the tax rate, but also the tax base. Given
that many tax reforms involve changes in the tax base, the study of these
two dimensions is central to the discussion in this paper. In the model, the
policy maker may benefit specific groups through tax exemptions. All agents
and goods are identical ex-ante and there is no economic rationale for such
exemptions. A broader tax base is more efficient, as it removes a wedge
between the prices of taxed- and tax-exempt goods. In political equilibrium,
certain goods may nevertheless be exempt from taxation. The rents from
tax exemptions are large and concentrated, while their costs are diffuse. If
a special interest benefits from a tax exemption, it will attempt to secure
a tax break despite its inefficiency. This phenomenon is familiar from our
understanding of special interest politics.2
The novelty is the study of the general equilibrium implications of the
inefficient policies that result. While a tax exemption increases the relative
demand for a good, the resulting inefficiencies reduce aggregate demand. The
model yields a simple expression that quantifies the general equilibrium losses
borne directly by the beneficiaries of tax exemptions. When inefficiencies in
the tax code reach a critical point, even the beneficiaries themselves are
willing to forgo their tax breaks in favor of tax reform: the elimination of all
tax exemptions.
Importantly, no (small) special interest would forgo its tax break in isola-
tion. The rents from a single exemption are large, but the general equilibrium
gains from its elimination are negligible. At the same time, a broad coalition
1Specifically, broadening the tax base was central in the tax policy platforms of both
presidential candidates in 2012. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/reform/tax-
reform/ and http://www.ontheissues.org/2012/mitt romney tax reform.htm
2See Grossman and Helpman (2002), for example.
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of special interests may agree collectively to give up their tax breaks for tax
reform. Marginal reforms are therefore politically difficult, while “big bang”
reforms are feasible via a grand bargain. I study the (minimum) coalition
size that would collectively forgo its tax exemptions for the enactment of tax
reform. I show that the size of this coalition is decreasing in the government’s
need to raise revenues. The scope for tax reform is therefore greater when
the government wishes to raise more revenues.
I explore political equilibrium in a simple lobbying framework. The in-
sights of the model are robust to a variety of collective choice frameworks,
but lobbying captures succinctly the conflict between special- and general-
interests, central to the politics of tax reform. Any citizen is free to lobby
the government at a fixed cost. Lobbyists bearing this cost are then repre-
sented equally in the policy maker’s objective function. I show that there are
strategic complementarities in lobbying choice. The tax base narrows when
more lobbyists seek tax breaks. Attaining the same revenues with a narrower
base requires higher statutory tax rates on all other citizens. More lobbying
therefore makes tax breaks more valuable, in turn giving greater incentive to
lobby. As in other settings, strategic complementarities may lead to multiple
equilibria. In one equilibrium, the tax base is comprehensive and citizens
do not lobby for tax breaks. In the other equilibrium, lobbyists enter the
political fray and secure tax breaks if public good needs are small. However,
there is a critical level of public goods, above which special interests forgo
their exemptions in favor of tax reform.
The model has a number of predictions on the politics of tax policy.
First, tax reform is more likely when revenue needs are high. Using data on
corporate tax legislation in a panel of OECD countries, I show in section 4
that legislation to broaden the tax base is indeed associated with high public
consumption and several other variables suggestive of fiscal strain.
Second, there is a tipping point that triggers tax reform. When it is
reached, policy changes discretely rather than gradually or on the margin.
In this setting, a reform-minded policy maker would be advised to propose
a “big bang” reform that takes on numerous special interests at once, rather
than gradually picking off individual interests. This provides a counterpoint
to theories of gradualism in reform (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992) and
much of the political economy literature of reform, where small or gradual
policy changes are typically easier to enact.3 In appendix B, I give a historical
3There is also a long tradition in public economics that assumes that the tax system
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overview of a number of recent tax reforms in OECD countries. Many of these
were large changes rather than tinkering on the margin of the tax code. The
Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 in the United States, for example, lowered the
top marginal income tax rate from 50% to 28%. As Birnbaum and Murray
(1987) write:
“Congress was a slow and cumbersome institution that usually
made only piecemeal, incremental changes. Tax reform proposed
something very different: a radical revamping of the entire tax
structure.” Kindle Loc. 504.
Third, tax reform typically involves a broadening of the tax base and
a reduction in marginal tax rates. A decrease in marginal rates may seem
surprising when public good needs are large. But not so if one recognizes that
the change in the tax base is discrete and large in a “big bang” tax reform.
This frees revenues to decrease marginal tax rates–politically necessary to
compensate losers from reform. This prediction contrasts with normative
theories of the tax base, where the tax base and tax rates increase in tandem.
In section 4, I show empirically that base-broadening reforms are associated
with cuts in statutory tax rates. Birnbaum and Murray (1987) suggest that
this combination was central to the politics of tax reform in the U.S.:
“Merging the lower rates of the supply-siders with the base-broadening
of the liberal tax reformers was the glue that held the 1986 tax bill
together. . . The ability of this unholy alliance to stick together
throughout an arduous process. . . was the key to success.” Kindle
Loc. 162.
Fourth, at a reform moment of this sort, tax reform obtains unanimous
support–even from the very special interests vying for tax breaks.
A large literature has studied the political forces shaping tax policy.4
Homing in on tax reform is motivated by a number of observations, which
help highlight this paper’s contribution. First, the landmark tax reforms of
recent decades involved changes in not only statutory tax rates, but also the
can only be altered on the margin due to political constraints. See Dixit (1975), Feldstein
(1976), and more recently Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2014).
4See Alt et al (2009) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) for comprehensive literature
reviews and Castanheira et al (2012) for discussions of the politics of tax reform.
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tax base. Broadening the tax base was one of the main objectives of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 in United States. Value-Added-Tax reforms in Canada
and Sweden, both enacted in 1991, involved significant increases in the tax
base. The 2000 corporate tax reform in Germany similarly involved a sub-
stantial broadening of the base. In existing theories of the political economy
of taxation, the tax base is typically exogenous and usually comprehensive.
The large normative literature building on Mirrlees (1971) has individuals
each taxed at a distinct rate and it is difficult to distinguish the tax base
from a continuum of statutory rates. Given the prominence of the tax base
in reform proposals, a model that makes such a distinction may contribute
to our understanding of the politics of taxation.
Second, the existing literature focuses primarily on vertical discrimination
in taxation. In, contrast, much of the discourse surrounding tax reforms
concern horizontal equity. For example, the TRA in the U.S. was explicitly
designed to be neutral in its impact on vertical income distribution. This
paper intentionally abstracts from questions of vertical equity and sharpens
the discussion on horizontal inequities in the tax code.
Finally, the tax system changes in leaps and bounds. The tax base re-
mains unchanged over long periods, with some tinkering with statutory rates
and tax exemptions within the existing tax system. These are punctuated
with occasional reforms that change the tax system more substantially. This
paper explores the politics of these reform moments.
The paper also relates to the literature on the politics of economic reform.5
A common thread in this literature is the tension between particularistic in-
terests and overall economic efficiency. This tension is present in this paper
as well, but it differs in its general equilibrium setting. General equilibrium
allows us to assess the individual losses and general equilibrium gains from
tax reforms. This provides new insights, such as the complementarity in spe-
cial interests’ lobbying incentives. It also provides a prediction that contrasts
with most existing studies of the political economy of reform: the political
benefit of big bang reforms.
The paper relates more generally to the large literature on the role of
special interest politics, the nexus between political and economic power, and
public choice mechanisms, among other explanations for “political failures”
5See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000); Alesina and Drazen (1991); Fernandez and Ro-
drick (1991); and Jain and Mukhand (2003).
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of this sort.6 Tax reform is just one instance of policy reform albeit one
where we can cast light on the persistence of inefficient policy more generally.
Illustrating these general points through the lens of tax policy has a number
of advantages. First, the dead-weight losses of inefficient tax policies are
readily assessed in a familiar public finance context, as are the benefits of tax
provisions targeted to special interests. Second, tax policy is a popular vehicle
for targeting special interests in practice. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO, 2013) estimates that the United States Treasury forgoes over one third
of potential individual income tax revenues through “tax expenditures”. This
sum is similar in magnitude to all discretionary spending in the U.S.7 Given
the sums involved, it is of independent interest to understand the politics of
tax expenditures.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the economic environment and derives citizens’ policy preferences. Section
3 describes the political model and equilibrium. Section 4 provides some
supportive evidence from corporate tax legislation in OECD countries. Sec-
tion 5 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix. The appendix also provides a
narrative history of recent tax reform in major economies and relates these
experiences to the model’s predictions. Robustness checks and extensions
can be found in the online appendix.
2 The Economy
This section outlines the economic structure of the model, how the economy
responds to tax policy, and citizens’ resulting policy preferences. The eco-
nomic structure builds on a normative literature of the optimal tax base:
Yitzhaki (1979), Wilson (1989), and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). Citizens
have CES preferences over the consumption of a measure-one continuum of
goods varieties. Income is taxed at a statutory tax rate τ , but some goods
are deductible from taxation. The measure of exempt goods is given by 1−f ,
so that f is a measure of the tax base. This gives two clear dimensions to
6See Grossman and Helpman (2002); Acemoglu and Robinson (2001); and Besley and
Coate (1998), respectively, as examples.
7GAO estimates: http://www.gao.gov/key issues/tax expenditures/issue summary
8Tax expenditures are not a uniquely U.S. phenomenon. Tax expenditures in Australia
and Italy are estimated at 8% of GDP, 6% in the U.K., and 4% in Spain, for example.
Source: Tyson (2014).
6
tax policy: statutory rates and the tax base.9
The model that follows differs from the aforementioned papers by adding
three general equilibrium components, each of which is essential to the dis-
cussion. First, competition in the goods market is monopolistic. This gives
producers profits increasing in the demand for their product. Producers
therefore have a vested interest in securing a tax break for their variety.
Second, production is endogenous, using elastically-supplied labor as an
input. This contrasts with the endowment economy studied in Yitzhaki
(1979) and others. Endogenous output creates feedback from tax policy to
aggregate demand and back to firms’ profits. A narrow tax base increases
the labor wedge, thus lowering output and aggregate demand. The tension
between the rents provided by individual breaks and the aggregate-demand
costs of a narrow tax base are central to the analysis.
Finally, while the existing literature is normative, the analysis here is
positive, with policy set due to political factors. In this section, we take policy
as given; the political determinants of policy are then studied in section 3.
2.1 Model Setup
Agents and Preferences The economy consists of a continuum of
identical citizens of unit measure indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each citizen is
a worker, consumer, entrepreneur, and citizen–terms that I will use inter-
changeably. The citizen values streams of consumption xj and hours worked
hj according to the function
uj = xj − (h
j)
1+ 1
η
1 + 1
η
. (1)
Citizens’ Income Each hour worked pays a wage of w units of the con-
sumption good. Consumer j also earns profits pij from a single firm she owns;
it is one of a unit measure of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firms’ indexes match
their owners’. The non-diversified ownership structure is somewhat stark, as
is the assumption that all citizens derive positive profit income. As I discuss
in section 2.2, any other ownership structure can be easily accommodated in
this framework.
9The model is isomorphic to one where a statutory consumption tax is applied to a
measure f of goods and 1 − f goods are exempt. The chosen formulation maps more
directly to major tax exemptions in the U.S.
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Consumption and Intermediate Goods Each firm produces a single
intermediate good variety, sold at a price of p (i). Let xj (i) denote consumer
j’s demand for variety i. Households bundle individual varieties through a
CES aggregate to give consumption xj of
xj =
[∫ 1
i=0
(
xj (i)
) ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
,
with ε ≥ 1 giving the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Tax Policy Public good needs are exogenously given as g and the gov-
ernment must raise sufficient tax revenues to finance them.10 I show in the
online appendix that the model’s results are robust to an endogenous de-
mand for public goods. Tax policy consists of two instruments: the tax rate
τ and the tax base f . Personal income whj + pij is taxed at a uniform rate
τ . However, varieties of intermediate goods in i ∈ [f, 1] are fully deductible
from income taxation.11
Given that intermediate goods are identical (e.g. in their price elasticity
of demand), there is no economic rationale to provide a tax exemption to
any specific variety. The theory of uniform commodity taxation, harking
back to Ramsey (1927), suggests that a social welfare maximizer would set
f = 1. Moreover, unlike the literature on the optimal tax base, I assume no
administrative costs to tax enforcement.12 Any deviation from a complete
tax base is therefore due political, rather than economic, forces.
This tax structure is a simple way to capture realistic features of the tax
code, namely that tax exemptions can be individually targeted to special
interests, but also that such exemptions tend to provide a discrete, rather
than a marginal, benefit to their recipients. It is not essential that deductible
10The public good is assumed to be a specific variety: i = 1. The government purchases
this good from firm i = 1 at a price of 1, which I will later show to be the market price of
the good in the absence of government intervention. In other words, the government does
not exploit its market power to affect the public good’s price, nor can the firm exploit
its position as the monopolistic provider of the public good to charge an unusually high
markup. The assumption that the government purchases a specific variety is for analytical
convenience, but does not affect any of the insights delivered by the model.
11Identifying tax exempt goods as those with higher i indexes is for notational conve-
nience and without loss of generality.
12Allowing for administrative costs would not alter the model’s results and would un-
necessarily obfuscate the political motivations for a narrow tax base.
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goods qualify for a 100% tax refund. Allowing for a continuum of tax breaks
would muddle the distinction between the tax base and the tax rate. In
the online appendix, I allow the tax system to be determined endogenously,
with a policy maker who can set the size of exemptions freely, and show that
the main insights do not rely on full exemption. In any case, administrative
factors may limit the number of existing tax brackets in practice: see Hettich
and Winer (1984) for a discussion.
Modeling the tax base in this way mirrors the main “holes” in the U.S.
income tax base. The largest tax exemptions include mortgage interest de-
duction ($67 billion in fiscal year 2014) and exclusion of employer provided
health insurance ($195 billion in fiscal year 2014).13 Income used for the
purchase of these goods is (partially) deductible from income taxation.
Budget Constraint and Consumer Choice Given tax policy {τ, f} ,
the consumer’s budget constraint is given by
∫ 1
i=0
p (i)xj (i) di︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption Expenditure
≤ (1− τ) (whj + pij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
After-tax income
+ τ
∫ 1
i=f
p (i)xj (i) di︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax deduction
(2)
Consumer choice is then to maximize (1) through a choice of varieties {xj (i)}1i=0
and labor supply hj, subject to (2).
Consumption Bundle and Demand for Varieties Consumer de-
mand for individual varieties is given by
xj (i) =
(
(1− τ (i)) p
c
p (i)
)ε
xj,
where τ (i) is the statutory rate τ for all goods in the tax base i ∈ [0, f) and
zero for all tax-exempt goods i ∈ [f, 1]. pc is the after-tax consumer price
index
pc ≡
(∫ 1
i=0
(
p (i)
1− τ (i)
)1−ε
di
) 1
1−ε
. (3)
13GAO estimates. See http://www.gao.gov/key issues/tax expenditures/issue summary
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Firms Each firm i has a technology that transforms h (i) units of labor
into zh (i) units of good i. Firms are identical in their productivity; firms with
heterogeneous productivities are studied in the online appendix. Each firm
faces a fully competitive labor market, but a monopolistically competitive
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) goods market. Monopolistic competition aides
our analysis in two ways. First, firms’ profits are decreasing in the tax
on their variety, so that tax exemptions are redistributive. Second, firms’
profits are proportional to the demand for their varieties, so that firms benefit
from higher aggregate demand, allowing for a general equilibrium demand
externality.
Each firm hires workers at the market wage w and sells its intermediate
good at price p (i). Profit maximization gives the standard result that prices
are set at a constant markup µ ≡ ε
ε−1 over marginal costs: p (i) = µ
w
z
.
Normalizing the producer price (identical for all firms) to one, the con-
sumer price index (3) can be written as pc = 1
1−τˆ , where τˆ is the effective tax
rate defined as
1− τˆ ≡ [f (1− τ)ε−1 + (1− f)] 1ε−1 .
The effective tax rate is equal to the labor wedge. It is useful to anticipate
at this point that raising one unit of revenues via an increase in the statutory
tax rate τ will always increase τˆ by more than raising the unit of revenues via
an expansion of the tax base f . Thus increases in tax rates are less efficient
than broadening the tax base.
Finally, firms’ profits are directly proportional to demand for their vari-
eties: pi (i) = µ−1
µ
x (i).
Government The government collects tax revenues
ρ = τ
(
wh+ pi −
∫ 1
i=f
p (i)x (i) di
)
, (4)
which are income tax revenues net of deductions. The government uses these
revenues to supply the public good, so that ρ ≥ g.
Labor Supply and Consumption Workers’ first order condition for
the supply of labor gives
h = hj =
(
z (1− τˆ)
µ
)η
. (5)
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Consumer j’s consumption can now be written as
xj = (1− τˆ) (whj + pi (j)) . (6)
2.2 Indirect Utility
The utility of citizen j is given by (1). hj is determined by (5) and xj is given
by (6), so that the indirect utility of a citizen j < 1 can be described by
uj =
(
z (1− τˆ)
µ
)η+1(
1
1 + η
+ (µ− 1) (1− τ (j))
ε
(1− τˆ)ε−1
)
.14 (7)
This indirect utility function can be separated into two easily-interpretable
terms. The first reflects the utility of the citizen in her role as worker; the
second, in her role as entrepreneur. The model can thus be easily adapted to
other assumptions regarding the distribution of ownership, monopoly rents,
and income in society. The assumption that every citizen owns a firm can
be easily altered, as can the assumption that workers do not share in the
monopoly rents of their employers.
The first term,
uW ≡ 1
1 + η
(
z (1− τˆ)
µ
)η+1
is the utility of citizen j as a worker. It gives the utility of consumption from
labor income net of the dis-utility of supplying this labor: wh − h1+
1
η
1+ 1
η
. It is
immediately apparent that all workers derive the same utility. In addition,
the effects of tax policy on this component of utility is entirely captured
by the effective tax rate τˆ . We will see that raising a unit of revenues by
increasing the statutory tax rate τ increases the effective tax rate τˆ by more
than raising revenues through a broadening of the tax base f . Workers
therefore always prefer the broadest possible tax base.
14Although µ is a function of ε, I treat the two as separate parameters in what follows.
This is without loss of generality as it leaves µ = εε−1 as a special case. De-linking markups
from the elasticity of substitution is readily obtained in a model with a two-tiered CES
with the markup deriving from the elasticity of substitution between closely-substitutable
varieties within industries whose goods are substitutable with an elasticity of ε. De-linking
the two parameters allows separate comparative statics for the two.
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The second term
pi (j) = (µ− 1)
(
z (1− τˆ)
µ
)η+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Demand
(1− τ (j))ε
(1− τˆ)ε−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative Demand
(8)
gives profits or the utility of citizen j in her role as entrepreneur. Profits
from the total sales of variety j are affected by both aggregate and relative
demand. The term labeled as aggregate demand is familiar from the utility
of workers, as it is proportional to total consumption. Aggregate demand is
decreasing in the effective tax rate.
The term 1−τˆ
1−τ(j) is the relative price of good j. Thus
(
1−τ(j)
1−τˆ
)ε−1
is the
relative demand for good j. This is the only term in citizens’ preferences
where the statutory tax rate and the tax base appear separately from the
effective tax rate. A higher statutory tax rate τ increases the relative price of
and lowers the relative demand for goods that are in the tax base. It lowers
the profits of “taxed” firms: those that do not have a tax exemption.15 The
tax base f determines whether a specific product is sheltered from taxation.
These two terms highlight how firms benefit from tax exemptions, but
also bear a cost, through general equilibrium channels. The value of securing
an individual tax exemption can be gleaned from a comparison between the
profits of a firm with, to one without, a tax exemption. Relative demand for
the product of the “exempt” firm is higher by a discrete margin. Accordingly,
this firm’s profits are higher by a discrete amount. Entrepreneurs have a
strong incentive to secure a tax exemption.
For a given revenue need, the effective tax rate is minimized, however,
by relying on the broadest possible tax base. Aggregate demand is therefore
harmed by a narrow tax base. The aggregate demand term in (8) demon-
strates that entrepreneurs internalize, to some extent, the costs of their tax
exemptions. However, the aggregate demand cost of any single tax exemp-
tion is infinitesimal, while the benefits to its recipient are not. No citizen
would unilaterally forgo her own tax benefit. The aggregate demand channel
does leave scope, however, for a group of citizens to benefit from collectively
forgoing their tax exemptions.
Consumers and taxed firms are always harmed by taxation. In contrast,
exempt firms may benefit from a higher effective tax rate. A higher effective
15Profits of all firms are taxed. I use the term “taxed firms” as shorthand for firms
whose goods are not tax deductible.
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tax rate decreases aggregate demand, but also increases the average price
level, without altering exempt goods’ prices. A higher τˆ thus increases the
relative demand for exempt goods. The aggregate demand cost of taxation
outweighs its relative demand benefit if and only if η + 1 > ε − 1.16. More
generally, citizens attitude to taxation, before considering the government’s
budget constraint, can be summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 All citizens prefer a lower tax rate and a narrower base if
(1− τˆ)ε−1 > (µ− 1) (ε− η − 2) . (9)
The lemma ranks utilities, not policy preferences, which would incorpo-
rate the trade-off between the need to raise public revenues and the cost of
taxation. Lemma 1 shows, however, that even in the absence of greater rev-
enue needs, tax-sheltered citizens may prefer higher effective tax rates. This
may occur only if ε− 1 > η + 1, i.e. if relative demand dominates aggregate
demand in determining the profits of tax-sheltered firms.
The possibility that tax-sheltered firms may prefer higher levels of taxa-
tion may have some interesting implications, but these go beyond the scope
of this paper and needlessly complicates analysis. In all that follows, I there-
fore restrict attention to parameter values such that all citizens dislike higher
taxes. Formally, I assume that (9) holds. Let us define this region of the
state space as one where citizens are tax averse and maintain this assumption
throughout the remainder of the analysis.17
16This echoes the result in Auerbach (1985) that the relative magnitudes of own- and
cross-elasticities are critical in determining the excess burden of taxation.
17Citizens disliking taxes is appealing a-priori, but also holds for realistic parameter-
izations. To see what it would take to violate (9), let us set η to the lower-end of its
estimated range at η = 0.3, where (9) is less likely to hold. The parameter ε is the elas-
ticity of substitution between varieties of goods. In our case, the relevant elasticity is
that between taxed and tax-exempt goods. While some differentiated taxation exists be-
tween narrowly defined products, the more relevant elasticity would appear to be between
broader categories, such as food items vs. housing vs. automobiles. I therefore set ε = 2,
following Broda and Weinstein (2006). With these parameters, the effective tax rate τˆ
would need to exceed 41% to violate (9). To put this in further perspective, with a tax
base of f = 80%–almost certainly an overestimate for the U.S., based on CBO estimates
(CBO, 2013)–this implies average statutory tax rates τ exceeding 60%. This tax rate is
on the higher bound of those observed across the world, and moreover exceeds the peak
of the Laffer curve, given the aforementioned parameter values and the assumed tax base.
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2.3 Policy Preferences
Revenues Preferences over policy must take the government’s budget
constraint into account. The logarithm of tax revenues ρ (τ, f) in (4) is given
by
log (ρ (τ, f)) = log τ + log f + η log (1− τˆ) + (ε− 1) log
(
1− τ
1− τˆ
)
+ ζ (z, η, ε) ,
(10)
where ζ (z, η, ε) is a term that does not contain the tax instruments f and
τ . An increase in either the tax base or the tax rate brings a direct propor-
tional increase in tax revenues, as captured by the first two terms in (10).
The remaining terms reflect changes in taxable income due to household
incentives. First, an increase in the effective tax rate decreases revenues pro-
portionally to the elasticity of labor supply: the standard disincentive effect
of labor taxation. But it is the effective rather than the statutory tax rate
that determines the labor wedge.
Tax revenues are further affected by revenue efficiency, captured by the
term 1−τ
1−τˆ : the ratio of the statutory and the effective net-of-tax rates. Rev-
enues are decreasing in the wedge between the prices of taxed goods and
the CPI, captured by this ratio. A larger wedge makes it more attractive to
avoid taxation by purchasing tax-deductible goods. The effect is increasing
in the elasticity of substitution across goods: ε.
Figure 1 plots the government’s budget constraint for a number of g
values.18 Each curve plots in {f, τ} space a set of tax base and rate combi-
nations that provide the same revenues. The curves are downward sloping
as broadening the base allows the government to decrease statutory rates
without losing revenues. Moving from left to right, these equi-revenue curves
are increasing in the revenues they generate.
18In this and all subsequent figures, the following parameter values are used. The Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is set at η = 0.5, an elasticity in the neighborhood of recent
studies using microeconomic data. The elasticity of substitution across varieties is set
to ε = 2, following Broda and Weinstein (2006). The relevant elasticity is that between
taxable and tax exempt goods, which are typically in broad product classifications such as
health care, housing, or basic foodstuffs. The markup is set to µ = 1.1, as is common in
the macroeconomics literature. I state explicitly when results depend on parameter values.
The chosen values–while empirically relevant–are primarily for graphical convenience.
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Policy Preferences of Citizen j We can now solve for the policy
preferences of a citizen given an exogenously-determined need for revenues
g. Obviously, the citizen prefers the good he produces to be tax exempt.
Taking the tax status of the good produced by citizen j’s firm as given, we
ask how the citizen wishes to raise tax revenues from the remainder of the
tax base. The preferred policy of citizen j is given by
max
τ,f
uj
s.t. ρ (τ, f) ≥ g.
An interior policy choice satisfies the optimality condition:
MCPF τ (j) = MCPF f (j) ,
where
MCPF τ (j) ≡ −∂u
j
∂τ
/
∂ρ
∂τ
and MCPF f (j) ≡ −∂u
j
∂f
/
∂ρ
∂f
,
are the marginal costs of public funds when a unit of tax revenues is raised
by increasing the tax rate and broadening the tax base, respectively. This
optimality condition is intuitive: the citizen wants both policy instruments
to be used until the marginal costs of raising an additional unit of revenues
using the two instruments are equalized.
However, as the following proposition states, the solution to the max-
imization problem is always a corner solution at f = 1. Citizens prefer
raising revenues by broadening the base than by increasing tax rates as long
as this does not affect their own tax status. As citizens are identical, except
for the tax status of the good they produce, we use E to denote any citizen
producing a tax-exempt good and T to denote any citizen whose product is
in the tax base.
Proposition 1 All citizens prefer raising taxes by broadening the base rather
than increasing rates, keeping their own tax status constant: MCPF τ (j) >
MCPF f (j), for any j ∈ {E, T} and any {f, τ} . f = 1 is the preferred policy
of all citizens, keeping their own tax status constant.
This implies directly that a social welfare planner–putting an equal weight
on the preferences of each citizen–would always set f = 1.
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The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. Broadening the tax
base lowers the statutory tax rate, i.e we shift down and to the right along
an equi-revenue curve in figure 1. This affects all citizens positively through
a decrease in the effective tax rate τˆ . The lower effective tax rate follows
from the uniform commodity taxation result: Lower statutory rates reduce
the wedge between taxed and exempt goods.
If a citizen could set policy in a dictatorial way, she would choose f ∼= 1
while maintaining a tax exemption for herself. Obviously, it is impossible
to have a complete tax base of f = 1 without eliminating individual tax
exemptions. This tension between a desire for a broad tax base on one hand
and for individual exemptions on the other, are central to the politics of tax
reform.19
This tension is illustrated in figure 2, which plots utility along equi-
revenue curves. The horizontal axis shows values of the tax base f , but
keep in mind that a broader tax base gives a lower statutory tax rate, as
in figure 1. The vertical axis gives utility with the dashed line showing the
utility of an exempt citizen and the solid line giving the utility of a taxed
citizen. Looking at the utility function in (7), it should come as no surprise
that exempt citizens obtain discretely higher utility. Proposition 1 states
that the these two curves are always upward sloping: citizens prefer the
broadest possible base. It follows that every citizen’s ideal policy is given at
the right-most X marker: Set the broadest possible tax base, while retaining
her own tax exemption.
The Value of a Tax Exemption We now turn to a result that will be
central in the politics of tax reform, studied in section 3. Namely, a citizen’s
willingness to pay for a tax exemption is decreasing in the tax base. This
can be seen graphically in figure 2, where the willingness to pay for a tax
exemption at a tax base f is the distance between the utility of the exempt
(dashed curve) and the utility of the taxed (solid curve). This gap narrows
as one moves from left to right in the figure, meaning that the value of a tax
break is decreasing in the tax base. This is a general feature of the model,
as described in the following proposition.
19I must credit Senator Russel Long for having stated this proposition much more
eloquently–if less rigorously–when he noted that the political ramifications of the tax
reform debate amounted to “Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that fellow behind the
tree!” (Cited in Mann, 2003 pp. 333).
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Proposition 2 The individual value of a tax exemption is
1) Decreasing in the tax base f
2) Increasing in revenue needs g
3) Increasing in ε
The proposition also states that a citizen’s willingness to pay for a tax
break is increasing in required public good funding g. This can be seen in
figure 3, which shows a similar comparison between the utility of taxed- and
exempt-citizens for several values of g. The curves further to the bottom of
the figure reflect higher values of public expenditure. As can be seen, the
gap between the utility of the exempt and the taxed is larger for curves
representing higher public expenditure, so that citizens’ willingness to pay
for a tax exemption is increasing in g.
The intuition for these results is straightforward. For a given amount of
revenues, a broader tax base allows a decrease in statutory tax rates τ . The
value of a tax exemption is proportional to the statutory tax rate, as can be
seen in (7). The value of a tax exemption is therefore decreasing in the tax
base.20
Similarly, for a given tax base, an increase in g necessitates an increase in
the statutory tax rate τ. This increases the relative cost of being in the tax
base and thus increases the value of a tax exemption. A higher elasticity of
substitution ε makes consumers more reactive to tax exemptions and makes
it more attractive for a firm to obtain one.
A corollary of proposition 2 is that there are strategic complementarities
in willingness to pay for tax exemptions. The larger is the existing number of
tax exemptions, the narrower is the tax base. A narrower tax base increases
citizens’ willingness to pay for exemptions. In section 3, we will see how
these strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria in lobbying for
tax breaks.
The Reform Tipping Point fR. Citizens prefer the broadest possible
tax base on one hand, but prefer to retain their own exemptions, on the
other. Obviously, these two objectives are at odds with each other. We now
ask when the desire for a broader tax base outweighs the parochial interest
for an individual tax break. A tax exemption provides a discrete gain for its
20The broader tax base also reduces the effective tax rate τˆ , which further amplifies this
effect.
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beneficiary, while the gains from its elimination are infinitesimal. A citizen
would never unilaterally forgo a tax exemption. However, when inefficiencies
in the tax code reach a critical point, beneficiaries from tax breaks are willing
to forgo their exemptions in favor of tax reform: the elimination of all tax
exemptions. This is illustrated in figure 2 with the marker labeled fR: the
tipping point for reform. At a tax base narrower than fR (f < fR), exempt
citizens are strictly better off reforming the tax system: eliminating all tax
exemptions. Thus a tax base narrower than fR provides an opportunity to
reform the tax system in a Pareto-improving way. Citizens, including the
exempt, are made better off by following the path along the right-pointing
arrow in figure 2. The value of tax exemptions increases roughly linearly in
tax rates, while the resulting dead-weight losses are convex. A critical tax
base fR exists, below which the latter force dominates the former.
The following proposition states that existence of a critical tax base fR
is a more general result: it exists for any parameter values.
Proposition 3 For any feasible revenue need g > 0, there is a cutoff tax
base fR ∈ (0, 1) so that exempt citizens prefer tax reform of f = 1 to another
tax base f, if and only if f < fR.
There are two separate factors that might determine the reform-triggering
tax base fR: feasibility and preferences. Which of the two is binding depends
on parameter values. First, the revenue need g might exhaust the govern-
ment’s fiscal capacity at the tax base of f = fR. That is, revenues of g require
taxing at the revenue-maximizing tax rate at this tax base. As revenues at
this point are increasing in f , no policy f < fR is feasible. Exempt citizens
are therefore forced to choose a tax base that is broader than fR.
Second, and more interestingly, there is a critical tax base at which ex-
empt citizens are exactly indifferent between tax reform and their own tax
exemptions, as in figure 2. The exempt strictly prefer tax reform if f < fR
and strictly prefer a tax base of f for all f > fR.
Big Bang vs. Piecemeal Reform Should economies eliminate the
rents to entrenched interests in one fell swoop, or is a more gradual approach
desirable? Dewatripont and Roland (1992) ask what a reform-minded leader
ought to do when faced with special interests: workers that must be compen-
sated when exiting a restructured industry. This is obviously a very different
context from the one studied here and they conclude that gradualism is
18
preferable, because it allows the government to screen workers for the value
they place on remaining in the existing industry and thus reduces the total
compensation required.
A different conclusion arises from this model. Looking again at figure
2, imagine that current policy has a tax base of f = fR (or any value of
f < fR). A reform-minded leader wishing to maximize general welfare wants
to eliminate all special provisions in the tax code and set f = 1. Now consider
the merits of gradualism or more ambitious reform in this context. At the
“big bang” extreme, the reformer removes all tax exemptions at once. This
is represented by the rightward-pointing arrow in figure 2. By the definition
of fR, special interests are no worse off under reform than under the status
quo; reform is Pareto improving. Special interests are compensated directly
by the general equilibrium benefits from reform and there are no losers in
need of compensation.
At the gradualist extreme, the reformer could eliminate one tax exemp-
tion at a time. Compensating the first special interest is costly, with the cost
represented by the downward-pointing arrow in figure 2. The total cost of re-
form, when removing tax exemptions one at a time and compensating losers
sequentially, is the area between the two curves in figure 2 to the right of
f = fR. This is obviously larger than the zero cost incurred under a big bang
reform. The ultimate payoffs from reform are not path dependent. But if the
policy maker cannot commit to follow through with this gradual reform, spe-
cial interests may nevertheless demand compensation along a gradual reform
path.
Central to this result is the general equilibrium nature of this framework
and its implications for Pareto-improving reform outlined in proposition 3.
One typically thinks of reform as being welfare increasing. It is the distri-
butional consequences that stand in the way of reform, with losers utilizing
some form of political power to block its enactment. By setting the agenda
appropriately as a choice between a large “big bang” change and the status
quo, a reform-minded politician may be able to obtain broad support for
reform without needing to compensate losers.
Naturally, the exact details of the policy process will be crucial in de-
termining how the agenda is set and whether reform is feasible. A study of
politics is the subject of section 3.
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Revenues and Tax Reform The tipping point for reform fR plays an
important role in the politics of tax reform. It is the critical tax base below
which special interests can be persuaded to forgo tax exemptions. Conversely,
1− fR is the largest number of exemptions that can be allocated to special
interests before these interests are collectively harmed by the porous tax
system. What then determines the value of fR?
The focus in this section will be primarily on the effects of government
fiscal needs as an impetus for tax reform. It seems plausible that support
for tax reform increases with the revenue needs of the government. Raising
higher revenues on a narrow base may be more difficult and might require
more distortionary taxation. This is precisely what we see in figure 3, which
shows the utility of taxed and exempt citizens for a number of values of g. As
before, the tax base is on the horizontal axis and solid lines give the utility
of taxed citizens and dashed lines give the utility of exempt. Each pair of
curves corresponds to a specific value of g, with higher values of g lower in
the figure. As before, the value of fR is represented with an X: this is the
tax base at which the utility of the exempt is equal to the utility of the taxed
under a reform of f = 1. As can be seen in the figure, fR is increasing in g.
The following proposition formalizes this result. It states that fR is in-
creasing in g for sufficiently high values of g or ε.
Proposition 4 If public good needs g are sufficiently high, the cutoff tax
base for reform fR is increasing in g. In addition, fR is increasing in g for
values of ε sufficiently high.
The proposition gives a result for high values of g, meaning that we
can say with confidence that high (enough) values of g will lead to higher
values of fR. The second part of the proposition states that for values of ε
sufficiently high, fR is increasing in g over the entire range. Note that both
these conditions are sufficient but neither of them is necessary. In fact, I was
unable to find a counterexample where fR was not strictly increasing in g.
Computational analysis further affirms that fR is increasing in g for the
entire range of feasible values of the public good and for a broad range of
parameter values. This is illustrated in figure 4 that shows the cutoff tax base
fR as a function of public goods g for a number of parameter values. The
horizontal axis gives values of g, while the vertical axis gives the correspond-
ing values of fR. The solid line plots results with parameter values as in the
previous figures (ε = 2 and η = 0.5). The line marked with circles shows a
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lower value of the elasticity of substitution across varieties (ε = 1: the Cobb
Douglass case). fR is increasing in both elasticities η and ε. Higher elastici-
ties make it easier to avoid taxation by substituting consumption from taxed
to exempt goods or by substituting consumption with leisure. This requires
higher statutory tax rates at any given tax base, increasing the inefficiency
of taxing at a narrow base. This reduces the number of tax exemptions that
are sustainable before their efficiency costs exceeds their value. Accordingly,
fR decreases with the lower value of ε.
The line marked with x gives a higher Frisch elasticity of labor supply
(η = 1), leading to higher values of fR for similar reasons. Finally, the line
marked with squares decreases the markup (to µ = 1.05 from the benchmark
value of µ = 1.1). Citizens benefit from tax exemptions through higher
profits, which are leveraged by the size of markups. A lower markup decreases
the private value of a tax break relative to the efficiency losses caused by
exemptions. We’d therefore expect fR to be decreasing in the markup µ, as
is indeed the case. In all parameter configurations–and a large range of other
parameter values–fR is increasing in g.
3 Politics
We now turn to policy determination and consider political forces preventing
or driving tax reform. The economic setting of the previous section and its
resulting payoffs call attention to the conflict between general and special
interests. In addition, lobbying appears to have played an important role the
political history of tax reform; Birnbaum and Murray (1987) give a blow-by-
blow account of the role of lobbies in resisting and then resigning themselves
to the 1986 TRA. A model of lobbying is therefore a natural setting to
explore the politics of this conflict. A lobbying model also highlights the
power of special interests to secure tax exemptions and as such pits the odds
against reform. It underscores the tipping point where even special interests
show restraint in vying for exemptions. The lobbying model is admittedly
and intentionally simple, but one that captures political insights that would
emerge in more involved settings. I discuss below the importance of each
simplifying assumption in detail and show results from a number of other
political frameworks (median voter, probabilistic voting, legislative politics)
in the online appendix.
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Setup The lobbying game proceeds in three stages. In the first stage,
the value g of public goods is still unknown. At a later stage, g will be drawn
randomly from a probability distribution function γ (g), whose support in-
cludes only feasible values of g. With this information in mind, all citizens
decide simultaneously whether to lobby. If citizen j chooses to lobby, she
faces a fixed cost of φj, measured in units of consumption. For expositional
ease, assume that this cost is the same for all citizens φj = φ ∀j, but results
are robust to any distribution of fixed costs across citizens. One can think of
this cost as a monetary “pay to play” fee, a minimal lobbying effort required
to gain access to politicians, or a fixed cost to special-interest-group organi-
zation. For the time being, imagine that the fixed cost is pure waste rather
than a transfer to politicians. I later consider the fixed cost as a price set by
a politician. Let L denote the measure of citizens who have chosen to lobby.
In the second stage, public good needs g are revealed. A policy maker
chooses a feasible policy {τ, f} and allocates tax exemptions to a measure
1−f of goods. Policy must satisfy the government’s budget constraint ρ ≥ g
and is set to maximize the aggregate utility of the L lobbyists. The policy
maker puts equal weight on the utility of each lobbyist and zero weight on the
preferences of non-lobbyists. Intuitively, citizens who have borne the fixed
cost of lobbying are “at the table” of the policy discussion, while others’ voices
are not heard. The government must set the same policy for all lobbyists
and cannot discriminate among them. If no citizens lobby, the policy maker
chooses a policy that maximizes social welfare (leading to a default policy of
f = 1).
In the third stage, policy is implemented, citizens choose consumption
baskets and labor supply and realize payoffs; firms choose production levels
and hire workers to maximize profits.
Policy Determination Given Lobby Size The model is solved via
backward induction. In the third stage, citizens face policy {f, τ}. A measure
f of goods is taxed and 1− f are exempt. The payoffs of taxed and exempt
citizens are given by (7) and were discussed extensively in the previous sec-
tion.
Entering the second stage, public good demand g is observed. The policy
maker maximizes the joint utility of the measure L of lobbyists subject to
the government’s budget constraint. Given that the policy maker may not
discriminate among lobbyists, the government can either exempt the entire
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lobbying coalition and set f = 1− L or exempt no one and set f = 1.
It follows directly from proposition 3 that the policy maker chooses to
exempt the coalition if and only if L ≤ 1− fR. More lobbyists necessitate a
tax base narrower than fR and lobbyists themselves are better off under tax
reform f = 1. This is as demonstrated in figure 2.21
The Costs and Benefits to Lobbying In the first stage, each cit-
izen decides whether to lobby. Citizen j’s lobbying strategy consists of a
probability of lobbying as a function of the measure of citizens who enter, L.
Denote the probability that citizen j lobbies if a measure L of citizens lob-
bies as qj (L). A Nash equilibrium is a set of lobbying probability functions
{qj (L)}1j=0 such that the resultant measure of lobbyists is consistent with
the entry probability of individual lobbyists. An equilibrium value of L is
therefore a solution to the fixed point L =
∫ 1
j=0
qj (L) dj.
To understand citizens’ incentives to lobby, consider the expected cost
and benefit of lobbying. The cost is straightforward and is captured by the
fixed cost φ. In studying expected benefits, consider first the benefit citizen
j obtains from being in the lobbying coalition if a value g is realized in
the second stage. We’ll use B (L, g) to denote the benefit to lobbying as
a function of the number of lobbyists at a public good level of g. This is
shown in figure 5 for two different values of g. The figure gives the benefit
to lobbying (before deducting the fixed cost to entry) as a function of L.
The benefit is given by the difference between lobbyists’ and other citizens’
utilities. If L ≤ 1−fR, lobbyists obtain tax exemptions and the tax base will
be f = 1−L. Accordingly, for all L ≤ 1− fR, the curve gives the difference
between the utility of the exempt and of the taxed at the corresponding tax
base: uE − uT . As can be seen from the figure, this benefit is increasing in
L. This follows from proposition 2 and is precisely a mirror image of the net
benefits to a tax exemption from figure 2. It is a mirror image because a
larger lobbying coalition L translates one to one into a narrower tax base f.
If L > 1 − fR, the policy maker will implement tax reform (f = 1).
If reform is passed, lobbyists don’t receive tax exemptions and there is no
benefit to lobbying. This is represented by the discrete downward jump to
zero in the benefit to lobbying in Figure 5.
21If L = 1−fR, the policymaker and lobbyists are indifferent between setting f = 1−L
and f = 1. Given that payoffs are the same in both cases, the tie breaking rule does not
affect citizens’ choices in the first stage of the game.
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The benefit to lobbying changes with public goods as could be expected
from our analysis in section 2. A high value of g shifts the curve upwards.
This follows from proposition 2 and was shown in figure 3: The value of a
tax break is increasing in g. However, fR is also increasing in g, as shown
in figures 3 and 4 and discussed in proposition 4. As g increases, the cutoff
1 − fR–where the benefit of lobbying goes to zero–therefore shifts to the
left in figure 5. With greater public good needs, there is a greater incentive
to secure a tax exemption. On the other hand, with greater public good
needs, a smaller number exemptions can be sustained: Higher values of g
make reform more desirable and therefore decrease the maximal sustainable
number of lobbyists.
Figure 6 shows the cost and expected benefit of lobbying for an individual
citizen, if L other citizens lobby. The two horizontal lines correspond to
two values of the entry cost φ. Expected benefits are represented by the
inverted-U-shape curve and are simply an integral over the benefit function
for all values of g: Eg {B (L, g)} =
∫
g
B (L, g) γ (g) dg.
The figure shows the expected benefits of lobbying for a specific PDF
function (normally distributed around a mean value of g) and the curve may
differ depending on the distribution. Specifically, other distributions might
have multiple peaks rather than the single peak shown in the figure. But
two features of this curve hold for any distribution and are central to the
description of equilibrium.
First, this curve is initially increasing (increasing at L = 0). For any
feasible value of g, expected benefits in the neighborhood of L = 0 are simply
a weighted average of the benefits of a tax exemption uE − uT . The benefits
of a tax exemption are decreasing in f for all g (proposition 2). As f = 1−L
in the second stage of the political game, expected benefits are increasing in
L for any g at L = 0.
Second, for L sufficiently high, the expected benefit of lobbying is zero.
If L is sufficiently high, then L > 1− fR for all g. In this case, the expected
benefit of lobbying is zero. The general shape of expected benefits of lob-
bying as a function of number of lobbyists is therefore as shown in figure 6.
The function is increasing for low values of L and ultimately decreasing to
zero. The function has at least one peak (but may have multiple peaks and
therefore is not generally inverted-U-shaped).
The value of L = 1−med (fR), indicated with a cross in the figure gives
the number of entering lobbyists that leads to reform with 50% probability
in the second stage of the game. med
(
fR
)
gives the median value of fR (fR
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evaluated at the median value of g). Higher values of g occur with probability
1
2
and lead to higher values of fR. In these cases L > 1− fR and the policy
maker opts for tax reform in the second stage. Lower values of g occur with
probability 1
2
, give L < 1− fR, and lead to f = 1− L in the second stage.
Equilibrium Number of Lobbyists Figure 6 illustrates how equi-
librium is determined. Considering first the low lobbying cost, the unique
equilibrium number of lobbyists is indicated with a circle, where the costs and
expected benefits of lobbying are equal. Given that all citizens are identical,
we cannot pin down the equilibrium identity of lobbyists, but their num-
ber is uniquely determined. If L were smaller, the expected value of lobbying
would exceed its costs. This could not constitute an equilibrium, as some cit-
izens could profitably deviate by increasing their lobbying probability qj (L)
at that value of L. If L were larger, the cost of lobbying would exceed its
expected value. Some citizens could profitably deviate by decreasing their
lobbying probability.
There is a large set of lobbying probability functions that support an
equilibrium, but all of them would have a fixed point at the unique value
of L represented with a circle in the figure. For example, one equilibrium is
symmetrical with all citizens choosing q (L) = L∗, where L∗ is the equilib-
rium measure of lobbyists. Another equilibrium has a measure L∗ of citizens
lobbying with probability one and the remainder lobbying with probability
zero.
For the low lobbying cost, equilibrium unfolds as follows. A measure L∗
of citizens lobbies in the first stage. In the second stage, the value of g is
drawn, with a corresponding value of fR. If L∗ < 1−fR, the equilibrium tax
base is f = 1 − L∗ with tax breaks going to all lobbyists. If L∗ > 1 − fR,
the equilibrium tax base is f = 1: tax reform. With the low lobbying cost
shown in the figure, L∗ exceeds 1−med (fR): The probability of tax reform
is greater than 50%. A large number of citizens nevertheless lobbies because
the cost of lobbying is low. They are willing to incur the lobbying cost to
secure a tax break if exemptions are allocated.
This points to a more general result. Lower fixed lobbying costs lead
to more lobbying but to a higher probability of tax reform. It is hardly
surprising that lower fixed costs encourage entry. The latter result may be
counterintuitive at first glance as one might think that more lobbying would
necessarily lead to a more a porous tax base. But lower lobbying costs
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democratize the lobbying process and more citizens are represented at the
table when tax breaks are allocated. When budgetary conditions allow (g is
sufficiently low), tax exemptions are distributed liberally and the tax base is
narrow. However, the large number of organized citizens puts high demands
on the tax system. Even moderate public good needs induce tax reform. At
the extreme, as lobbying costs approach zero, L approaches 1, and tax reform
always passes. If all citizens lobby, they all receive equal weight, and policy
is as a social planner would choose.
There are two equilibria in the higher lobbying cost scenario, indicated
with squares in figure 6. The right-most of the two parallels the equilibrium in
the low lobbying cost case. The cost of lobbying equals its expected benefits
at this point. In the high lobbying cost scenario, an additional equilibrium
exists at L = 0. If no other citizens lobby, the cost of lobbying exceeds
its expected benefits and no individual citizen wishes to lobby.22 Multiple
equilibria are not a curiosity of this specific lobbying framework, but a more
general feature of the economic setting. As noted in proposition 2 and shown
in figure 2, the payoff from a tax exemption is decreasing in the tax base. This
leads to strategic complementarity in lobbying for tax breaks. The larger the
number of lobbyists, the larger are the returns to lobbying for other citizens.
This strategic complementarity is the source of multiple equilibria in this
setting.
Finally, if the cost of lobbying were so high so as to exceed its expected
benefit everywhere, the unique equilibrium would be L = 0 and therefore
f = 1.
Modeling Assumptions I make a number of simplifying assumptions
in the discussion above, but the model is robust to more general specifi-
cations. I introduced uncertainty in public good needs to smooth citizen’s
preferences. Discrete jumps in preferences pose problems for equilibrium
existence and introducing uncertainty is one way to avoid them.
The fixed cost to lobbying is a reasonable, but critical, assumption. As
mentioned earlier, with no fixed costs all citizens will lobby and f = 1 is
always the unique equilibrium. Our main political concern is the conflict
between special and general interests and the fixed cost allows us to make
22The remaining intersection between the cost and expected benefit curves is not an
equilibrium. With this measure of lobbyists, a citizen could deviate by increasing her
lobbying probability and the expected benefits of lobbying would exceed its cost.
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this distinction.
The model can be easily adapted to allow variable lobbying costs in ad-
dition to fixed costs. For example, the model would have similar results if
lobbyists faced an additional cost proportional to the policy benefits they
receive. An extension of this sort would merely shift rents from lobbyists
to the policy maker and induce less citizens to lobby, but would not change
results qualitatively.23
I presented results assuming that all citizens face the same lobbying cost
φi = φ. A model with heterogeneous lobbying costs could help pin down the
equilibrium identity of lobbying citizens, but would not change the qualitative
nature of aggregate outcomes. Not surprisingly, citizens with lower lobbying
costs would be more likely to lobby.
A model with heterogeneous fixed costs nests as a special case the pos-
sibility that a some groups are organized for political action, while others
are not. This is a common assumption in special interest models such as in
Grossman and Helpman (2002). This is easily accommodated in our setting
by giving a zero fixed entry cost to the organized group and an infinite cost
to everyone else. Allowing for less extreme versions of cost heterogeneity has
the advantage of pinning down the equilibrium number of lobbyists, rather
than by assumption. The interested reader is referred to the online appendix
for a model with heterogeneity in political organization.
Equal policy weights for all lobbyists is a reasonable benchmark given
that all citizens are identical ex ante. If weights were unequal, the benefits of
lobbying would depend on these weights and differ across citizens. Citizens
would then vary in their willingness to lobby and we might be able to pin
down the identity of citizens in the lobbying coalition. Aggregate results
would remain qualitatively similar. In the online appendix I analyze a more
general case with arbitrary policy weights on citizens.
The assumption that the policy maker cares only about lobbyists and
puts zero weights on other citizens is stark, but not crucial, as long as the
policy maker puts a greater weight on the preferences of lobbyists. A policy
maker concerned with general welfare will obviously be more likely to pass
reform, reducing the incentive to lobby somewhat. Otherwise, results are
qualitatively the same.
23In a menu auction as in Grossman and Helpman (2002) there would be no entry
into lobbying, however. As is well-known, in their setting a models of taxation with a
continuum of agents give all rents to the policy maker.
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The default that the policy maker maximizes social welfare if no one
lobbies arises endogenously if the policy maker puts some weight on social
welfare. The assumption can be therefore be viewed as a limiting case as
the weight on non-lobbyists goes to zero. An appeal of this assumption is
that it avoids discontinuities in the value of lobbying. Other default poli-
cies would lead to a discrete jump in the return to lobbying at L = 0. If
the default policy were different, e.g. a status quo inherited from an earlier
period, most results nevertheless go through. However, the no-lobbying equi-
librium is eliminated under certain default policies. If the default policy is
sufficiently bad (has a narrow base), the benefits of lobbying at L = 0 could
exceed its costs and citizens would bear the fixed cost to lobbying to avoid
the unfavorable status quo. In these conditions, the L = 0 equilibrium is
eliminated and the equilibrium with a at the rightmost square in figure 6 is
unique.
The fixed cost to lobbying is pure waste rather than a transfer to a politi-
cian. One could alternatively think of φ as a price set by a politician. The
high value of φ in figure 6 is plotted so as to maximize political contributions.
A politician would choose this price and attempt to coordinate lobbyists on
the lobbying equilibrium. This point is such that a marginal decrease in φ
loses a measure of φ revenues from existing lobbyists: equal to the lobbying
contribution gained from the last lobbyist to enter.24
To simplify analysis I assumed that the policy maker cannot discrimi-
nate between members of the lobbying coalition and must offer a policy that
provides them with identical outcomes. This is a natural assumption if the
lobbying coalition is a cohesively organized group that promises equal treat-
ment to its members. Results are generally the same if the policy maker can
discriminate between lobbyists.25
Finally, I show in the online appendix that the model’s results hold up
if the policy maker can choose to allocate partial deductions, if government
24This is also the outcome if the politician holds an all-pay auction and chooses the
number of allocated lobbying slots to maximize revenues. I thank Roger Lagunoff for this
insight.
25For example, if we allow the policy maker to provide tax exemptions to a random
subset lobbyists, there is a small region L > 1 − fR where lobbyists would choose to
have a lottery that allocates tax exemptions to a subset of lobbyists, rather than passing
full reform. This small intermediate region involves a gradual transition to f = 1 as L
increases rather than the sharp one in the baseline model. The value of lobbying then
declines less sharply to zero as L surpasses fR, but all other insights remain intact.
28
spending is endogenous, and if firms have heterogeneous productivities.
4 Evidence from Corporate Tax Reforms
In this section, I provide evidence from tax base changes in OECD countries
that is consistent a number of the model’s predictions. A main prediction
is that tax reform occurs when the government faces high revenue needs
(proposition 4). A second prediction is that tax reform is a “big bang”
move from a narrow tax base of fR to a broader base. I provide qualitative
historical evidence that tax reforms did in fact involve significant changes in
the tax system in appendix B. One testable implication of a big bang reform
is that it frees up sufficient revenues to allow a reduction in statutory tax
rates.
These two predictions are explored using data on corporate taxation col-
lected by Kawano and Slemrod (KS, 2012). These data document legislative
changes to the corporate tax base in 30 OECD countries from 1980 to 2004.
The data include both high-income and emerging economies and episodes of
rising and declining corporate tax rates. KS document changes in the tax
base including changes in the generosity of investment credits, loss carry-
forward rules, depreciation allowances, and others. I define a dummy vari-
able reform that takes on a value of one if the tax base was broadened by
any of the KS measures. In the reported regressions, I focus only on the tax
base for domestic corporations as questions of international taxation go be-
yond the scope of this paper. The results are nevertheless robust to including
international tax legislation as well.
Corporate taxation was not the main source of tax revenues for countries
in the sample. However, data on the breadth of the income tax base or VAT
base for a large sample of countries is not readily available. It is nevertheless
interesting to explore whether the model’s predictions are supported in the
available corporate tax data.
Corresponding to the theory, I measure public revenue needs by a single
variable g: in this case government consumption as a percentage of GDP
(source: World Bank).26 In a dynamic context, however, government can
de-link current revenue needs from public good provision by borrowing. As
I discuss below, using government revenues as a percentage of GDP (source:
26While total government spending might be a more comprehensive measure of fiscal
strain, the panel data coverage of this variable is much smaller.
29
OECD), or debt to GDP (source: World Bank debt tables) leads to broadly
similar results. These latter variables may better represent accumulated fiscal
pressures rather than current spending needs. Naturally, all these variables
may be affected by the tax reform itself or other common factors and are
meant to be no more than suggestive. One obvious control (not reported)
is GDP itself. Controlling for GDP growth does not alter results (and the
coefficient on GDP growth is insignificant throughout).
The narrow focus on corporate taxation gives the government other (and
larger) bases from which to draw revenues. It is therefore useful to have a
measure that homes in on the fiscal strain to the corporate sector. I use the
statutory tax rate as another measure of the fiscal needs of the government
(or the degree to which the government relies on corporate taxation for its
fiscal needs.)
Results are shown in table 1. The first column of the gives the result
from an OLS regression of the reform dummy on government consumption
as a fraction of GDP and shows that base-broadening reforms generally occur
when spending is higher. Column 2 adds the corporate tax rate at the year
of reform and shows that governments broaden the corporate tax base when
existing tax rates are high. This too, is as could be expected from the theory:
reform occurs when revenue needs are high and when the tax base is narrow,
requiring higher statutory rates. This second regression also includes the
change in the statutory corporate tax rate in the year of the reform. The
negative coefficient suggests that the corporate tax rate is cut simultaneously
with the increase in the tax base.
The fact that the tax base and statutory tax rates move in opposite
directions is not an obvious accounting identity. If fiscal pressures are large,
the government may be forced to increase both dimensions of tax policy
simultaneously. This is in fact what normative theories of the tax base, such
as Yitzhaki (1979) and the literature that follows, would suggest. There,
the tax base is narrow because of the administrative cost of enforcing a
broader base. The optimal tax base equalizes the marginal cost of enforcing
taxes with the marginal dead-weight losses due to the narrow tax base. In
this normative literature, a government facing financing pressures would bear
both these costs on the margin and increase the statutory rate while enforcing
a broader tax base. The fact that statutory tax rates are cut when the
government legislates a broader tax base suggests that a different force is at
play here. The result is consistent with the theory proposed in this paper,
where the government needs the lower statutory tax rates to compensate
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losers from the base-broadening reform.
Conceptually, we are less interested in the cross-sectional aspect of the
data, as our theory has more to say about when a given country passes reform
than which country is more likely to pass reform measures. Indeed, country-
specific factors may confound our results. The same political dysfunctionality
that makes it hard for a country to pass reform may make it harder for the
government to raise revenues more generally. Similarly, a country unable to
broaden the tax base may be forced to rely on higher statutory rates. The
remaining columns therefore include country fixed effects. Column 3 shows
that the results survive the inclusion of country fixed effects. The next two
columns show that the results are robust to a probit specification (column
4), and inclusion of year (column 5) fixed effects.
Finally, in column 6, I replace government consumption with government
revenues as a percentage of GDP (with country and year fixed effects). The
results are robust to measuring fiscal strain in this way. The results are
similar when using debt to GDP to measure fiscal strain, although in this
case the result is statistically significant with year, but not country, fixed
effects. This suggests that public indebtedness is a better predictor of which
country will enact reform than when a specific country broadens its tax base.
The result is nevertheless broadly consistent with the theory.
Certainly, one should be wary of simple correlations of this sort; I make no
causal claims; and there may certainly be bias due to omitted variables. The
corporate tax base is only a part of the tax code, and many of the landmark
tax reforms described in the appendix focused on income or sales taxes.
These correlations are nevertheless suggestive that the theory presented in
this paper is broadly consistent with a set of carefully-documented reforms.
5 Concluding Remarks
The enactment of tax reform is a highly political process. Reformers’ desire
to bring about a simpler, more efficient, and “fairer” tax system is often
stonewalled because of the distributional consequences of such change. This
paper proposes a tractable model of the political economy of tax reform.
When revenue needs are low, they can be met more easily with narrow tax
bases. Special interests focus on securing parochial tax benefits, each of
which has a only minor implications for overall efficiency, but combined may
bring significant dead-weight losses. Greater revenue needs are more costly
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to fund with a narrow tax base. Special interests become increasingly willing
to forgo their own tax breaks in favor of efficiency as revenues increase. A
tipping point arrives when tax reform is feasible.
Politically feasible reform, however, may not be etching at the margin of
the tax code, but a significant overhaul of the tax system. This contrasts with
the common view that small changes entail smaller political costs than bigger
ones do. The general equilibrium benefits are small if only one special interest
is confronted. But forging a grand bargain where a number of special interests
is targeted simultaneously may improve efficiency sufficiently to compensate
all losers.
I hope this study will stimulate further interest in formal analysis of the
political economy of tax reform. Social choice in this model is through a
simple lobbying model. Extensions including voting models and more gen-
eral political preferences are explored in the online appendix. But this is
admittedly not the final word on the rich legislative processes involved in
the passage of tax reform. I have no doubt that more could be said on the
role of special interests in determining the tax code. Of particular interest
is the collective action problem involved in “big bang” reforms studied here.
Much has been written about the collective action problem within special
interest groups (see Olsen, 1971, for example), but a large reform may re-
quire coordination across special interests as well. This paper illustrates why
all special interests might agree to forgo their tax benefits collectively, but
not individually. This obviously creates a free-rider problem that may be
worthy of further inquiry. Agenda setting and framing of policy choices may
give politicians a central role in coordinating special interests towards the
common good.
I have assumed that changes in the tax base come about only through
policy. In addition, in this setting, a tax reform induced by a shock (to rev-
enues, for example) is reversed once the shock subsides. Casual observation
suggests that the tax base erodes through a qualitatively different process
than its expansion. The private sector devotes much energy to minimize
payments under a given tax code, and much of the depreciation of the tax
base occurs due to individual, rather than collective decisions. It may be
interesting to consider active tax avoidance, and how this feeds back into the
political process that determines tax policy.
A narrow tax base causes labor misallocation, with excessive production
of tax-exempt goods. The model highlights that this affects the labor wedge,
but has no effect on aggregate productivity, as firms are all equally produc-
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tive. The impacts of misallocation on total factor productivity is a growing
field of macroeconomic inquiry.27 The framework studied here may help shed
light on the political determinants of misallocation and thus indirectly on
questions of economic development. The online appendix introduces firms
with heterogeneous productivities as a step in that direction. Introducing
capital as a factor of production may also be of interest.
In a world increasingly open to trade and capital flows, there may be
international implications as well. The importance of the aggregate demand
channel favoring tax reform might be diminished in a small open economy.
The demand for an open economy’s goods is determined partly by tax policy
elsewhere. In addition “tax competitiveness” may be a separate pressure for
tax reform in such a setting, particularly with respect to corporate taxation.
Finally, I have ignored considerations of vertical equity in this analy-
sis. This omission was intentional, to emphasize political forces, rather than
equity considerations, driving redistribution. A study of the interaction be-
tween vertical and horizontal equity may also prove fruitful.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Throughout, let
T (j) ≡ 1− τ (j) ; Tˆ ≡ 1− τˆ ; θ ≡ 1− τ
1− τˆ ≤ 1.
We use the superscript T to denote a citizen who produces a taxed good and E
to denote a citizen with a tax exemption.
A.1 Lemma 1
Exempt Citizens Owners of exempt firms have
d log uE
dy
=
∂ log uE
∂Tˆ
∂Tˆ
∂y
, (11)
for y ∈ {f, τ}. Noting that
∂ log uE
∂Tˆ
=
1
Tˆ
+ (µ−1)(η+2−ε)
Tˆ ε
1
1+η
+ µ−1
Tˆ ε−1
> 0,
with the inequality following from assumption (9). Noting further that ∂Tˆ
∂f
<
0 and ∂Tˆ
∂τ
< 0, then ∂u
E
∂τ
< 0 and ∂u
E
∂f
< 0 both hold. In the case of exempt
citizens, we have a stronger result than stated in the proposition: (9) is both
a sufficient and necessary condition for these citizens dislike tax increases,
either by broadening the base or increasing statutory rates.
Taxed Citizens For an owner of a taxed firm,
d log uT
dy
=
∂ log uT
∂Tˆ
∂Tˆ
∂y
+
∂ log uT
∂y
.
The first term captures the effects of taxes through the effective tax rate,
and the second captures the direct effects of the tax changes.
Given that ∂ log u
T
∂f
= 0, as f doesn’t appear independently of τˆ in utility (7),
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and that ∂Tˆ
∂f
< 0, taxed citizens dislike increases in the tax base iff
∂ log uT
∂Tˆ
=
1
Tˆ
+ (µ−1)(η+2−ε)
Tˆ ε
T ε
1
1+η
+ (µ− 1) T ε
Tˆ ε−1
> 0,
which holds under assumption (9).
As for statutory taxes:
d log uT
dτ
= −
1
Tˆ
+ (µ− 1) (η + 2− ε) θε−1 (1− fθε−1)
1
1+η
+ (µ− 1) T ε
Tˆ ε−1
< 0
Taxed citizens also prefer a lower tax rate.
A.2 Proposition 1
Using (10), we have
d log ρ
dτ
=
1
τ
− ε− 1
T
+
η − ε+ 1
Tˆ
∂Tˆ
∂τ
and
d log ρ
df
=
1
f
+
η − ε+ 1
Tˆ
∂Tˆ
∂f
.
Using marginal utilities from (11), it can be shown that for exempt citizens,
MCPF τ (E) > MCPF f (E) (12)
is equivalent to
1− τ − (ε− 1) τ − (1− τ)ε < 0,
if assumption (9) holds. This latter inequality holds for all τ > 0, so that
exempt firms always prefer tax base increases to tax rate increases, as long
as this does not change their tax status.
Turning to taxed citizens, it is easy to show that
∂uT
∂τ
/
∂uT
∂f
>
∂uE
∂τ
/
∂uE
∂f
,
i.e., citizens whose firms bear the brunt of taxation find increases in statu-
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tory taxes even more costly relative to base-broadening measures than do
citizens with tax exemptions. It then follows directly that MCPF τ (T ) >
MCPF f (T ) , i.e. taxed citizens also prefer broadening the base to increasing
statutory rates.
If MCPF τ (j) > MCPF f (j) for both the taxed and the exempt, it must be
the case that the optimal tax base for every citizen is f = 1, keeping the tax
status of the citizen in question unchanged.
A.3 Proposition 2
Define
U j (f, g) ≡ max
τ
{
uj (f, τ) + Λ (ρ (f, τ)− g)} , (13)
giving the utility of a citizen j if the tax base is f and the statutory rate is
chosen to raise g units of revenues.
At a tax base of f and public good needs of g, the individual value of a tax
exemption is equal to
∆EU (f, g) ≡ UE (f, g)− UT (f, g) :
the difference between the utility of the exempt and the taxed.
The value of a tax break and f Applying the envelope theorem to (13)
∂U j (f, g)
∂f
=
∂ρ (f, τ˜ (f, g))
∂f
(
MCPF τ (j)−MCPF f (j)) ,
where τ˜ is the statutory tax rate that raises g units of revenues when the tax
base is f. Then
∂∆EU (f, g)
∂f
< 0
iff
MCPF τ (T )−MCPF f (T ) > MCPF τ (E)−MCPF f (E) .
38
With some derivation, it can be shown that this is equivalent to
∂ log uT (f, τ)
∂Tˆ
[
∂Tˆ
∂f
∂ρ (f, τ) /∂τ
∂ρ (f, τ) /∂f
− ∂Tˆ
∂τ
]
− ∂ log u
T
∂τ
>
∂ log uE (f, τ)
∂Tˆ
[
∂Tˆ
∂f
∂ρ (f, τ) /∂τ
∂ρ (f, τ) /∂f
− ∂Tˆ
∂τ
]
.
This inequality holds because
∂ log uT (f, τ)
∂Tˆ
>
∂ log uE (f, τ)
∂Tˆ
, (14)
while
∂Tˆ
∂f
∂ρ (f, τ) /∂τ
∂ρ (f, τ) /∂f
− ∂Tˆ
∂τ
> 0,
and
∂ log uT
∂τ
< 0. (15)
Therefore the value of a tax break is decreasing in f.
The value of a tax break and g Applying the envelope theorem to (13)
∂U j (f, g)
∂g
= Λ = MCPF τ (j) .
Then
∂∆EU (f, g)
∂g
> 0
iff
MCPF τ (T ) > MCPF τ (E) ,
which is equivalent to
∂ log uT (f, τ)
∂Tˆ
∂Tˆ
∂τ
+
∂ log uT (f, τ) /∂τ
∂Tˆ /∂τ
>
∂ log uE (f, τ)
∂Tˆ
,
which holds because (14), (15) and ∂Tˆ
∂τ
< 0 hold.
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The value of a tax break and ε Using (7), the value of a tax exemption
can alternatively be written as
∆EU (f, g) =
(
zTˆ
µ
)η+1
(µ− 1) 1− T
ε
Tˆ ε−1
.
Then
∂ log
(
∆EU (f, g)
)
∂ε
= − log Tˆ − T
ε log T
1− T ε > 0,
because Tˆ and T are both smaller than 1.
The value of a tax break and η
∂ log
(
∆EU (f, g)
)
∂η
= log
(
Tˆ z
µ
)
This is greater than zero if the equilibrium real after-tax real wage (Tˆw) is
greater than one, i.e. if aggregate demand is increasing in the Frisch elasticity.
A.4 Proposition 3
Put formally, we are stating that for any g, there exists a value fR ∈ (0, 1),
such that for all f˜ ≤ fR
UT (1, g) ≥ UE
(
f˜ , g
)
(16)
or
ρ
(
f˜ , τ˜
)
< g
for all τ˜ , where U (f, g) is given by (13). In words, there exists a cutoff
tax base fR, below which exempt citizens are better off with tax reform at
f = 1 (at which they are taxed) than being at any feasible narrower tax base
f˜ < fR.
The proof relies on the fact that the function UE (f, g) is increasing in f for
all f ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, at one extreme (f = 1), UE (1, g) > UT (1, g) , so
that (16) is violated for sufficiently high values of f . This is true because a
tax exemption gives positive utility, all else equal. At the other extreme, if
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f is sufficiently low, UE (f, g) goes to zero, while UT (1, g) > 0, so that (16)
must hold. With UE (f, g) increasing and spanning values above and below
UT (1, g), there must be a value of f = fR at which these two utilities are
equal. Moreover, citizens are better off with tax reform if and only if f > fR.
I now demonstrate that it is the case that for sufficiently low values of f ,
UE (f, g) goes to zero. This is because the slope of UE (f, g) becomes infinite
as f changes, for sufficiently low values of f . In the proof of proposition 2, I
showed that
∂UE (f, g)
∂f
=
∂ρ (f, τ˜ (f, g))
∂f
(
MCPF τ (j)−MCPF f (j)) > 0.
For any feasible value of f, ∂ρ
∂f
and MCPF f (j) are both strictly positive
and finite. The numerator of MCPF τ (j) is positive and finite, while its
denominator goes to zero as f approaches its lowest feasible value. This last
statement is true because the statutory tax rate must be set at its revenue-
maximizing rate as f approaches its lowest feasible value. At the revenue
maximizing rate, ∂ρ(f,τ)
∂τ
= 0, by definition. Thus ∂U
E(f,g)
∂f
goes to infinity for
sufficiently low values of f .
Below some threshold value of f it is of course the case that revenues of g are
no longer feasible. It still remains the fact that no feasible policy exists with
a narrower base that makes the exempt better off than under reform. (One
might think of such cases as reform being induced due to feasibility rather
than desirability to lobbyists.)
A.5 Proposition 4
It is easy to show that if fR is determined by feasibility, i.e. fR is the
narrowest tax base at which g is feasible, then fR is increasing in g. In this
case, τ is set at its revenue-maximizing rate at fR, given by
1− τ¯
τ¯
= (η − ε) f θ¯ε + ε, where (17)
θ¯ =
1− τ¯
f (1− τ¯) + 1− f .
It is easy to show that at the revenue maximizing rate τ¯ , tax revenues are
increasing in f , so that an increase in g requires an increase in fR to remain
41
feasible.
If, instead, fR is determined by preferences, fR is defined by
uE
(
fR, τR
)
= uT
(
1, τ 1
)
, (18)
where τR and τ 1 are the tax rates required to raise g in revenues, if the tax base
is fR and 1, respectively:
ρ
(
fR, τR
)
= ρ
(
1, τ 1
)
= g (19)
This last equation simply maps τ 1 onto g with τ 1 naturally increasing in g.
We can therefore conduct comparative statics with respect to τ 1, taken as
an exogenous parameter with results for g following.
{
fR, τR
}
are defined
implicitly by (18) and the first equality in (19). Conducting comparative
statics using these two equations, we obtain that
∂fR
∂τ 1
=
MCPFEτ
(
fR, τR
)−MCPF Tτ (1, τ 1)
MCPFEτ (f
R, τR)−MCPFEf (fR, τR)
∂ρ (1, τ 1) /∂τ
∂ρ (fR, τR) /∂f
.
As long as we are on the correct side of the Laffer curve, the marginal revenue
terms are positive. Also, proposition 1 states that the difference in marginal
costs of public funds in the denominator is positive. Therefore ∂f
R
∂g
> 0 if
and only if
MCPFEτ
(
fR, τR
)
> MCPF Tτ
(
1, τ 1
)
. (20)
I now argue that this condition must hold for g sufficiently high. With g
sufficiently high, we can make
{
fR, τR
}
be arbitrarily close to the peak
of the Laffer curve, but with τ 1 still away from the Laffer curve peak at
f = 1. At the peak of the Laffer curve, marginal revenues are zero and
MCPFEτ
(
fR, τR
)
goes to infinity. It must therefore be larger than the finite
value of MCPF Tτ (1, τ
1). The inequality 20 holds and fR is increasing in g.
The second part of the proposition states that fR is increasing in g for values
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of ε sufficiently high. Condition (20) can be rewritten as
1 + (µ− 1) (η + 2− ε) /Tˆ (fR, τR)ε−1
1 + (µ− 1) (η + 2)T 1 >
θ
(
fR, τR
) 1− τR
1−τR
[
(ε− 1) (1− fRθ (fR, τR))+ ηfRθ (fR, τR)]
1− τ1
1−τ1η
.
Recalling that µ ≡ ε
ε−1 , the left hand side of this equation can be made
arbitrarily close to 1 for ε sufficiently high. The right hand side is always
strictly less than one if ε > η + 1. This is because θ < 1, τR > τ 1 and
fR < 1. Thus for ε sufficiently large, this inequality holds and fR is increasing
in g. Note that these are both sufficient–not a necessary–conditions. The
relationship appears to hold for any values of ε, µ, and η.
B Tax Reform in Recent History
In this appendix I contextualize the model in light of some historical experi-
ences of tax reform in a number of countries.
United States The landmark tax reform of the past several decades in the
United States was the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Its main objectives were to
simplify the tax code, broaden the tax base and increase fairness, primar-
ily considering horizontal equity–all features of tax reform as described in
the theory. Revenue needs were perceived to be great at the time, with a
federal budget deficit in excess of 5% of GDP that year. Some prominent
Republican leaders, including Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole initially
opposed revenue-neutral tax reform because they believed that deficit reduc-
tion should take priority (Birnbaum and Murray 1987, Kindle Loc. 301 ).
This is consistent with the model, where high revenue needs trigger tax re-
form.
Nevertheless, reform was ultimately designed to be revenue-neutral, with signif-
icant reductions in marginal tax rates combined with base-broadening mea-
sures. Accounts of the political process suggest that a combination of re-
ductions in tax rates and broadening the tax base were necessary for the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act.
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Support for the Tax Reform Act was bipartisan, passing the Senate 74 to 23
and the House of Representatives by 292-136.28 The political process lead
to compromise between uncommon political bedfellows. As Birnbaum and
Murray (1987) state:
“Merging the lower rates of the supply-siders with the base-broadening
of the liberal tax reformers was the glue that held the 1986 tax bill
together. . . The ability of this unholy alliance to stick together
throughout an arduous process. . . was the key to success.” Kindle
Loc. 162.
The change in the tax code was significant, rather than marginal, with top
marginal tax rates dropping from 50% to 28%. Again, Birnbaum and Murray
(1987) write:
“Congress was a slow and cumbersome institution that usually
made only piecemeal, incremental changes. Tax reform proposed
something very different: a radical revamping of the entire tax
structure.” Kindle Loc. 504.
It is interesting to contrast the 1986 experience with the 1981 Economic Recov-
ery Act and the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act. These were two of a series of tax
changes enacted during President Reagan’s first term in office. Although the
1981 act was larger in its overall revenue implications than the 1986 reform—
the latter was intended to be roughly revenue neutral—its main objective was
to lower the overall tax burden rather than a wholesale reform of the tax sys-
tem. The 1984 law was passed due to concerns over the government deficit
(Romer and Romer, 2010). These smaller changes in the tax code corre-
spond more closely to the predictions of Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989),
as the tax rate and the tax base moved in the same direction. Alongside
cuts in marginal income tax rates included in the 1981 bill, new depreciation
guidelines decreased the tax base as well. The 1984 bill, designed to increase
revenues, reduced tax benefits for tax-exempt entity leasing and other base-
broadening measures. In contrast, the large, tax reform grand bargain of
1986 saw the tax base and tax rate moving in opposite directions. This is
28The initial Senate vote prior to the Conference Committee was close to unanimous at
97 to 3, demonstrating the breadth of support for tax reform in general.
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inconsistent with the predictions of models where administrative costs are
the main barrier to base broadening policies, but coherent with the theory
presented in this paper.
Canada In other countries, tax reform has followed similar patterns. The
main objective of Canada’s “1985 Plan” was the reduction of the Federal
deficit: It came amidst a significant effort to consolidate the Federal budget.
The plan was, however, accompanied by proposals to reform the Canadian
tax code. (See Sancak, Liu and Nakata, 2011.) These led to legislation in
1987 that broadened the personal and corporate tax base and eliminated
deductions, while lowering corporate tax rates.
The second phase of tax reform was introduced in 1991, with a reform of the
sales tax. The reform replaced the 13.5% Manufacturers’ Sales Tax with a
5% Goods and Services Tax, introduced a more transparent tax that pro-
vided a more equal treatment of business, thus broadening the sales-tax base
alongside the lower tax rates.
Germany The German tax reform of 2000—passed after a decade of debates—
was discussed in the context of fiscal consolidation. Chancellor Gerhard
Shroeder’s initial proposals were for fiscal consolidation and tax cuts. (See
IMF, 1999; IMF, 2000; and Breuer, Gottschalk, and Anna Ivanova, 2011.)
The theory in this paper provides a rationalization for these seemingly con-
tradictory aims. Prior to the reform, the corporate tax base was so narrow
that the 45% statutory rate on retained earnings raised only 2% of GDP in
revenues (IMF, 2000). Corporate tax reform involved a broadening of the
tax base, limitations to depreciation allowances, and lowering top marginal
tax rates. Personal income tax rates were also decreased, although without
substantial changes in the tax base.
The German experience may also highlight the broader applicability of the po-
litical economy of reform presented in this paper. Not only was corporate
tax reform comprehensive, rather than a marginal elimination of individual
tax benefits, but was also bundled together in a broader reform agenda. Tax
reform was one element of the Agenda 2010 reform plan of the Schroeder ad-
ministration. Rather than taking a piecemeal approach to reform, as would
be advocated by a gradualism, Schroeder proposed reforming several aspects
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of economic policy simultaneously.29 The reform package included labor mar-
ket reforms, social benefit reform, and tax reform. A gradualist view to re-
form would suggest that such an ambitious agenda is foolhardy or doomed
to failure. Our theory provides some insights on the political viability of
such a grand policy of reform. While each individual reform proposal had
winners and losers, the general equilibrium benefits of wide-sweeping reform
may have been sufficient to compensate losers. The bundling of reforms may
have been a recipe for success rather than a formula for failure.
Latin America Mahon (2004) and Focanti et al (2013) conduct panel regres-
sions of determinants of tax reform in Latin America and both find that high
inflation was the main domestic driver of tax reform. Given that high infla-
tion in the region has often been due to fiscal pressures, this too is consistent
with the theory that revenue needs are a stimulant for tax reform. Sanchez
(2006) reviews the history of and political forces motivating tax reform in
Latin America. He describes tax reforms undertaken in Latin America over
the past three decades “to create simpler, more efficient tax systems with
a greater emphasis on indirect taxes of broader bases, and more moderate
marginal tax rates.” (pp. 772) He too cites the debt crises of the 1980s as
the leading domestic forces towards reform.
Sweden The Swedish tax reform of 1991 was dubbed by some the “tax reform
of the century” (Agell et al, 1996). The reform involved a significant reduc-
tion in personal income tax rates, estimated to lose as much as six percent
of GDP in tax revenues. A large part of these reductions in marginal tax
rates were financed by a broadening of the VAT tax base to include goods
and services that were previously exempt, as well as the elimination of tax
loopholes. Consistent with the model, tax reform passed in the aftermath of
a fiscal crisis, with the debt to GDP ratio increasing from 40% of GDP in
1980 to over 60% by the middle of the decade and a currency crisis following
at the end of the decade. The reform was passed by a left-wing government,
in what was viewed as a shift in policy, consistent with consensus for tax
reform at a reform moment, predicted by the theory.
29The Agenda 2010 reform program was first announced in March 2003. See
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub document.cfm?document id=3973
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United Kingdom In the United Kingdom, the 1980s and early 1990s were
also periods of tax reform, partially stimulated by debt consolidation at-
tempts. (See Ahnert, Hughes and Takahashi, 2011.) In 1980, the Thatcher
government faced a fiscal deficit of 4.8%. After failed attempts by his pre-
decessor to rein in the deficit, Chancellor Nigel Lawson presented a plan
in 1984 that envisaged a deficit reduction of nearly four percentage points.
The lion’s share of the consolidation came on the expenditure side, while tax
reform measures were planned to be roughly revenue neutral. The reform
package included a reduction in the corporation tax rate from 52% to 35%,
financed by base-broadening measures.
Recent Events Recent discussions of tax reform in the U.S. have arisen again
in a time of budget consolidation. Alongside debates about the relative
merits of expenditure cuts and tax increases, a debate has also emerged as
to whether new revenues should come through increases in marginal tax
rates or broadening the tax base. Again, as in the Tax Reform Act of
1986, there have been strong political pressures to compensate for base-
broadening measures with decreases in marginal rates. (See for example
the House of Representative’s Committee on the Budget Budget proposal in
2014: http://budget.house.gov/.)
The European sovereign debt crisis has also brought tax reform to the forefront.
This is consistent with the theory presented here, where large revenue needs
trigger tax reform. While it is still early to predict whether any significant
reform will be enacted, nor what form it will take, there are some early
indicators of reforms along the lines suggested here. The Financial Times
predicts that
“At the heart of the overhaul [of the Spanish tax code] will be an
election-friendly move to lower marginal rates on income and cor-
porate tax. The headline reductions will be balanced by steps to
broaden the tax base, mostly by eliminating some of the exemp-
tions and deductions that litter the system.” Financial Times,
February 10, 2014.
The notion that base-broadening measures will have to “bought” with lower
tax rates seems to be on the minds of reform-oriented politicians.
In summary, several of the largest successful efforts to reform the tax code in the
U.S. and other industrialized countries in the past few decades seem to con-
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form with the general features of the model. Tax reform successfully passes
through the political process as alongside efforts to reign in deficits–in times
of high revenue needs. They often involve broadening the tax base, used to
finance reductions in marginal tax rates. Reforms were often comprehensive,
eliminating many tax breaks in one fell swoop, rather that gradualist. In
some instances these gained broad and bipartisan support that was unex-
pected to political observers at the time.
References for this appendix can be found in the online appendix.
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Figure 1: Budget Curves
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This figure shows budget curves. Points along each curve are combinations of a
tax base f and a statutory tax rate τ that raise the same revenues. The curves
further to the right raise higher revenues. Parameter values here and in later
figures: η = 0.5, ε = 2, µ = 1.1.
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Figure 2: Utility of Taxed and Exempt Along A Budget Curve
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The curves show the utility of citizens whose firm has a tax exemption (dashed
line) and those who are not exempt (solid line) as a function of the tax base f .
The curves are along a balanced-budget path, i.e. all points on the curves raise
the same amount of revenues. The leftmost marker (X) is the utility maximizing
policy for a citizen: the broadest possible tax base, while retaining her own tax
exemption. The point fR is the tax base that is the tipping point for reform. At
this tax base, exempt citizens are indifferent between retaining their exemption
and a tax reform that eliminates all exemptions. The two arrows represent utility
losses to losers from reform. The downward arrow is the loss of utility as part of a
gradual reform that eliminates one tax exemption at a time. The rightward arrow
represents the loss of utility (equaling zero) as part of a “big bang” reform that
eliminates all exemptions simultaneously.
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Figure 3: Utility of the Taxed and Exempt for Several Values of g
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This figure shows the utility of citizens with tax exemptions (dashed lines) and
those who are taxed (solid lines). Each pair of curves represents a specific value of
the public good g. Curves further to the bottom reflect higher levels of g. The Xs
indicate the tax base that triggers reform for that level of public goods: fR. This
is the tax base that leaves the exempt indifferent between a reform that eliminates
all exemptions and a tax exemption at that tax base. The figure illustrates that
fR is increasing in g. It also shows that the value of a tax exemption–the gap
between the dashed and solid lines–is increasing in g.
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Figure 4: The Reform-Triggering Tax Base fR vs. Public Goods g
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This figure shows the reform-triggering tax base fR as a function of g, for several
parameterizations. In all cases, fR is increasing in g. The solid line uses the
benchmark parametrization of η = 0.5, ε = 2, µ = 1.1. The circle markers use
ε = 1. The square markers use η = 1. The cross markers use µ = 1.05.
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Figure 5: The Benefit of Lobbying vs. the Number of Lobbyists
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The benefit of lobbying is plotted against the number of lobbyists entering the
lobbying game, for two values of g. The benefit of lobbying is the value of a
tax exemption, if tax exemptions are distributed in equilibrium. This benefit is
decreasing in the tax base and therefore increasing in the number of lobbyists,
as long as exemptions are allocated. There is a discrete downward jump in the
value of lobbying where tax reform is enacted. Higher values of g increase the
value of tax exemptions when they are distributed, but also reduces the number
of lobbyists that can be sustained in equilibrium before reform is passed.
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Figure 6: The Cost and Expected Benefit of Lobbying
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The expected benefit of lobbying is plotted against the number of lobbyists, before
the value of public goods g is realized. In this figure, g is drawn from a normal
distribution, but the general shape of the curve would be similar for any distribu-
tion. Two values of φ, the cost of lobbying, are plotted. For the low lobbying cost,
equilibrium is at the circle where costs and expected benefits are equal. The two
equilibria for the high cost are shown in squares. The cross indicates one minus
the tax base that leads to tax reform with probability 12 .
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Table 1: Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Reform
1 2 3 4 5 6
g/GDP
.009** .010** .009** .032** .008** .007*
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.014) (.003) (.004)
Corp. Tax Rate
.009*** .007*** .026*** .008*** .007*
(.002) (.002) (.009) (.003) (.004)
∆ Tax Rate
-.017*** -.018*** -.060*** -.020*** -.014**
(.006) (.006) (.022) (.007) (.006)
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
R2 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.19
n 709 621 621 566 621 653
Panel evidence on the relationship between base-broadening reforms, revenue
needs, and changes in statutory rates. Data for 30 countries from 1980-2004. A
list of countries and definitions of base-broadening measures are found in Kawano
and Slemrod (2012): The source of this variable. Dependent variable is a dummy
taking on the value of 1 if a base-broadening measure was legislated that country
and year. Independent variables are government consumption as a fraction of GDP
(source: World Bank), the current statutory corporate tax rate (source: Kawano
and Slemrod, 2012), and the change in the corporate tax rate. Regressions are
OLS, with the exception of Column 4, giving results from a Probit regression.
Column 6 replaces the first independent variable with revenues as a fraction of
GDP (source: OECD). Base broadening legislation occurs when government con-
sumption and statutory rates are high and are associated with a decrease in the
statutory tax rate. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% confidence levels, respectively
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